Dane on Choice of Law Provisions & Party Autonomy

Perry Dane (Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey - Rutgers Law School) has posted Party Autonomy and the Challenge of Choice of Law (Philosophical Foundations of Conflict of Laws (Oxford University Press, Roxana Banu, Michael Green, Ralf Michaels, eds., 2022) (Forthcoming)) on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

A perennial question in choice of law is whether parties to a contract can select the jurisdiction whose law will govern their contract. This so-called “party autonomy” problem is vexing and intriguing, in part because contemporary discussions often overlook in contemporary discussions.

The party autonomy problem is more consequential than most issues in choice of law. But it is also important as a singular window into the intellectual fabric of choice of law and as a leading edge for new and potentially subversive insights.

This essay is a chapter in an Oxford University Press volume on the “Philosophical Foundations of Conflict of Laws.” The essay argues that party autonomy does not have one comprehensive justification, but that it might be justified by a set of distinct if overlapping arguments that point to vital ideas often overlooked in the contemporary conversation. If choice of law doctrine embraces party autonomy, it might be in part because its shapers instinctively and inchoately recognize those considerations.

The most speculative and problematic argument is based on a version of natural law. Another argument relies on an important distinction between what I have called second-order and first-order choice of law. Yet another builds on an effort at a more sophisticated understanding of what it means for persons to be attached (or to attach themselves) to the legitimate governance of a legal system. The last argument is grounded in legal pluralism, though not of the usual sort.

These distinct bases for party autonomy are not only of theoretical interest. They also generate different answers to some of the material subsidiary questions that arise in any doctrinal consideration of party autonomy. That in turn suggests that the doctrine of party autonomy might require more nuance and fine-grained distinctions than most current treatments have given it.

Dancig-Rosenberg & Feldman on Behavioral Ethics & Criminal Law

Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg (UC Berkeley School of Law; Bar-Ilan University) & Yuval Feldman (Bar-Ilan University - Faculty of Law) have posted A Behavioral Ethics Perspective on the Theory of Criminal Law & Punishment on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

This chapter examines how the field of behavioral ethics – the study of how people make and perceive ethical decisions and behavior – could influence the theory and doctrine of criminal law and criminal punishment. It will do so by exploring a number of contexts in which applying behavioral ethics principles yield normative insights into criminal law and punishment doctrines.

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Foran on Common Law and the Common Good

Foran on Common Law and the Common Good

Michael P. Foran (University of Glasgow) has posted Common Law and The Common Good on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

This paper will be presented at the festschrift for TRS Allan, a mentor and friend. The last few years have seen a renaissance of thinking about the common good amongst constitutional scholars working within the common law world. Interestingly however, analysis of the common good remains grounded primarily within the classic legal tradition, itself rooted in civilian jurisprudence. The connection between the common good and the common law tradition, particularly common law constitutionalism, remains somewhat underexplored. Drawing on the work of TRS Allan, I hope to bridge some of this divide in emphasis by exploring the role of the common law within the classical natural law tradition. However, I also wish to suggest that neutrality on questions of the good life, a hallmark of Dworkin’s political liberalism, is not sustainable in light of the commitment, embraced by both him and Allan, that law must serve the public good. If law is to be a public asset – a common good – it cannot refuse to take a stand on the flourishing of legal subjects. Indeed, it manifestly does not. To constitute a defensible scheme of justice, law must be justified as a plausible attempt at the common good, intended to improve the lives of its subjects by facilitating their flourishing among a community of moral equals. With this in mind, common good constitutionalism presents a challenge and a rallying cry to anti-positivists, encouraging them to follow through on their commitment to the idea that the rule of law demands good government in the best interests of the governed. To do this, we must think seriously about what those interests require, paying sufficient attention to the specific context and institutional history of our law. Good government cannot be neutral on the quality of the lives of subjects any more than it can be neutral on the nature and scope of fundamental rights.

Keyword 

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Aburabia on Muslim Women in Polygamous Marriage in Israel

Based on empirical evidence from the Shari’a court in Beersheba of the ratification of customary polygamous marriages, the article examines the complexity of legal recognition of second marriages and the structural conditions under which polygamy is possible in the plural legal orders that exist in Israel. Although polygamy is criminally prohibited by the state of Israel, this prohibition is not enforced among the Bedouin in Israel, where 18.5 percent of Bedouin households are polygamous. This article demonstrates how these conditions perpetuate patriarchal norms among the Bedouin under the auspices of colonial legal structures.

Hindi translate 

प्रथागत बहुविवाह के अनुसमर्थन के बेर्शेबा में शरीयत अदालत से अनुभवजन्य साक्ष्य के आधार पर, लेख दूसरे विवाहों की कानूनी मान्यता की जटिलता और संरचनात्मक परिस्थितियों की जांच करता है जिसके तहत बहुविवाह बहुवचन कानूनी आदेशों में संभव है जो इजरायल में मौजूद हैं। हालाँकि बहुविवाह को इज़राइल राज्य द्वारा आपराधिक रूप से प्रतिबंधित किया गया है, यह निषेध इज़राइल में बेडौइन के बीच लागू नहीं है, जहाँ 18.5 प्रतिशत बेडौइन परिवार बहुविवाह हैं। यह लेख दर्शाता है कि कैसे ये स्थितियां औपनिवेशिक कानूनी संरचनाओं के तत्वावधान में बेडौइन के बीच पितृसत्तात्मक मानदंडों को कायम रखती हैं।
 Keyword 

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Balganesh on Learned Hand & Copyright

Shyamkrishna Balganesh (Columbia University - Law School) has posted Learned Hand's Copyright Law (Journal of the Copyright Society of U.S.A., Vol. 70, Forthcoming 2023) on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

Learned Hand is often described as the greatest copyright judge to have ever sat on the bench. By the 1950s, the most important parts of U.S. copyright law had been his creation, all from his time as a judge on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Despite all of this, there has been little systematic analysis of Hand’s approach to copyright and of the reasons why his jurisprudence in multiple areas of copyright law have survived the test of time. This Article argues that the longevity, influence and canonical status of Hand’s contributions to copyright are closely tied to his judicial method—best described as that of “empowered incertitude”—which he brought to bear rather directly on the area. Despite being governed by a federal statute, copyright law demands commitments to both judicial creativity and institutional deference. In addition, it requires judges to balance these opposing commitments, which Hand’s judicial method was particularly well-suited to. In the process, Hand developed a rich and nuanced institutional theory of copyright law, which foreshadowed the turn that copyright law would take after his time on the bench. Understanding Hand’s approach to copyright law embodies underappreciated lessons for how judges ought to approach copyright adjudication and lawmaking in the modern context.

Highly recommended.

Hindi translate 

लर्न हैंड को अक्सर बेंच पर बैठने वाले सबसे महान कॉपीराइट जज के रूप में वर्णित किया जाता है। 1950 के दशक तक, यू.एस. कॉपीराइट कानून का सबसे महत्वपूर्ण हिस्सा उनकी रचना थी, जो उनके समय से दूसरे सर्किट कोर्ट ऑफ अपील्स में एक न्यायाधीश के रूप में थी। इन सबके बावजूद, कॉपीराइट के लिए हैंड के दृष्टिकोण का बहुत कम व्यवस्थित विश्लेषण किया गया है और उन कारणों का कि कॉपीराइट कानून के कई क्षेत्रों में उनका न्यायशास्त्र समय की कसौटी पर खरा क्यों उतरा है। इस अनुच्छेद का तर्क है कि कॉपीराइट में हाथ के योगदान की दीर्घायु, प्रभाव और विहित स्थिति उनकी न्यायिक पद्धति से निकटता से जुड़ी हुई है - जिसे "सशक्त अनिश्चितता" के रूप में वर्णित किया गया है - जिसे उन्होंने सीधे क्षेत्र पर सहन करने के लिए लाया। एक संघीय क़ानून द्वारा शासित होने के बावजूद, कॉपीराइट कानून न्यायिक रचनात्मकता और संस्थागत सम्मान दोनों के लिए प्रतिबद्धताओं की मांग करता है। इसके अलावा, इन विरोधी प्रतिबद्धताओं को संतुलित करने के लिए न्यायाधीशों की आवश्यकता होती है, जो हाथ की न्यायिक पद्धति विशेष रूप से उपयुक्त थी। इस प्रक्रिया में, हैंड ने कॉपीराइट कानून का एक समृद्ध और सूक्ष्म संस्थागत सिद्धांत विकसित किया, जिसने उस मोड़ का पूर्वाभास किया जो कॉपीराइट कानून बेंच पर उसके समय के बाद लेगा। कॉपीराइट कानून के लिए हैंड के दृष्टिकोण को समझना, आधुनिक संदर्भ में न्यायाधीशों को कॉपीराइट निर्णय और कानून बनाने के तरीके के बारे में बहुत कम सबक देना चाहिए। अत्यधिक सिफारिशित
Keyword 

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